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Abstract 
 
The continued adoption of Additive Manufacturing 
(AM) technologies is raising concerns in the security, 
forensics, and intelligence gathering communities. 
These concerns range from identifying and mitigating 
compromised devices, to theft of intellectual property, 
to sabotage, to the production of prohibited objects. 
Previous research has provided insight into the 
retrieval of configuration information maintained on 
the devices, but this work shows that the devices can 
additionally maintain information about the print 
process. Comparisons between before and after images 
taken from an AM device reveal details about the 
device’s activities, including printed designs, menu 
interactions, and the print history. Patterns in the 
storage of that information also may be useful for 
reducing the amount of data that needs to be examined 
during an investigation. These results provide a 
foundation for future investigations regarding the tools 
and processes suitable for examining these devices.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Additive Manufacturing (AM), also known as 3D 
printing, is a manufacturing technique that constructs 
objects by adding consecutive layers of material. 
Gartner [1] predicts that the increasing usage of AM 
technologies will enable the creation of new business 
models. In addition, the report predicts increased 
penetration into consumer manufacturing, aerospace, 
and healthcare industries. From a local market 
perspective, consumer 3D printers allow home users to 
produce a variety of objects based on designs 
downloaded via Internet repositories, purchased from 
third-party designers, or created by the user using 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) software. A 2017 
report by Arizton Advisory & Intelligence’s [2] 
forecast that the 3D Printing Market revenues will 
surpass $11 billion by 2022. 
While this technology has significant potential to 
enhance both the capabilities and reach of 
manufacturing, the potential for misuse is a cause for 
concern. Fruehauf et al. [3] note that the flexibility of 
this family of manufacturing processes permits the 
creation of a wide variety of objects, from trinkets and 
custom components to Automated Teller Machine 
(ATM) skimmers, weapons, and illicit chemicals. 
Several researchers have also voiced apprehensions 
about the technology enabling infringement on 
Intellectual Property (IP) [4-6]. In addition, security 
researchers investigating these technologies have 
successfully demonstrated means of subverting the 
devices [7, 8], the data files and communications 
protocols involved in the manufacturing process [9, 
10], and have even considered the use of the AM 
system itself as a weapon [11]. The potential for 
misuse coupled with the vulnerabilities present in the 
underlying devices contributes to the likelihood that 
these devices will need to be examined in a forensic 
manner to assist corporate, civil, and criminal 
investigations. 
A growing concern in the digital forensics 
community is the volume and variety of data collected 
during an investigation. Garfinkle [12] identified the 
increasing size of storage media and increasing 
connectedness of systems as challenges for forensic 
practitioners. Shaw and Atkins [13] also found that 
forensic analysis of embedded devices was often 
dependent on data residing on other systems connected 
to the operation of the device.  Miller et al. [14] found 
a theme of connectedness in the workflows for AM 
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 systems, particularly in systems which offered greater 
functionality. Quick and Choo [15] surveyed the 
research addressing these challenges and found 
significant deficits in the use of data reduction 
techniques, data mining, and intelligent analysis. 
Tassone et al. [16] endorsed the use of visualizations to 
attempt to reduce both the data volume and cognitive 
load. These findings coupled with the ever-increasing 
evolution of technology capabilities forewarn that 
investigations including AM systems are likely to be 
complex and time-consuming, necessitating the 
development of data reduction strategies. 
This atmosphere prompts the hypothesis that AM 
devices can be profiled after legitimate user 
interactions from a residual data perspective. To 
address this hypothesis, the following research 
questions were identified: Can data be extracted from 
an AM device? If so, does that data contain residual 
data of the print operations? Are current digital 
forensics tools able to retrieve and process this data? 
Can the volume be reduced in a forensically sound 
manner? 
The contribution of this research is two-fold. First, 
it provides an empirical demonstration of the viability 
of residual data on a specific 3D printer. In doing so, it 
documents artifacts that could be useful in an 
investigation. Second, it provides the foundation for 
future investigations regarding the tools and processes 
suitable for examining these devices. This paper 
structure is as follows: Section 2 presents related work, 
Section 3 presents the method for the exploratory 
examination and experiment. Section 4 presents results 
and analysis, Section 5 discusses the results, and 
Section 6 presents the conclusions and details future 
work.  
 
2. Related Work  
 
Widespread use of embedded systems prompted 
research into systems [13] [17], and the residual data 
they contain [18]. The continued incorporation of AM 
technologies into commercial manufacturing processes 
and the rapid development of manufacturing in the 
private sector indicates AM will follow a similar trend 
of increasing ubiquity. This trend is encouraging 
researchers to look into 3D printers to proactively 
develop methods for examining AM devices and 
systems in a forensic context [14] [19]. 
According to Shaw and Atkins [13], an embedded 
system is a non-user-programmable computer 
performing a few dedicated functions. They highlight 
access to the data storage media as a major challenge 
to forensic analysis in these systems. They state that 
many embedded systems include data storage 
components as integral parts of the device, which can 
make the removal of the data storage for traditional 
forensic image acquisition difficult and increase the 
risk of altering or destroying data.  
Despite the difficulties presented by these devices, 
researchers have detailed the investigations of 
embedded systems. Van Vliet et al. [17] described the 
investigation of a ground-level controller after a fire in 
a wind turbine. They noted several obstacles to 
acquiring the log entries from the device, including the 
need to supplement the onboard batteries to maintain 
the logs and the decision to recreate a portion of the 
controller’s logical environment prior to log retrieval. 
Log retrieval involved using a manufacturer provided 
tool to access the stored data. The process and results 
of the Vliet’s case study are representative of the 
investigation techniques examined by Shaw and Atkins 
[13]. Both have a component of known origin and 
involved significant collaboration with the 
manufacturer of the device. 
Grispos et al. [18] examined smartphones as a 
proxy for forensic analysis of cloud storage services. 
The authors’ experimental methods centered on 
preparing smartphones with cloud storage applications 
linked to accounts with experimental files, then 
performing well-defined file manipulations. Residual 
data from these manipulations was captured from both 
internal memory and an SD memory card. The results 
showed a large amount of residual and metadata was 
left intact when files were deleted from the local 
device, and that many manipulations had identifiable 
residual effects. The authors conclude that smartphones 
can serve as a forensic proxy for cloud storage 
services, even with a black-box view of the application 
in question. 
Unfortunately, not all embedded systems originate 
from known a device manufacturer. Souvignet et al. 
[20] detail the investigation of an ATM card skimmer 
located by police in the European Union. The device in 
question was constructed from several commodity 
hardware components. The authors documented a 
combination strategy for their analysis.  The first stage 
of their investigation consisted of a black box analysis 
in which they examined the hardware to determine 
likely device capabilities.  From the results of that 
analysis, the decision was made to physically deprotect 
the microcontroller to facilitate access to the device 
firmware. From the firmware, they were able to reverse 
engineer the encryption routine and recover most of the 
information the device contained. They go on to 
describe an Android application created to enable the 
detection of the devices via Bluetooth radio. This work 
shows not only a successful device analysis but also 
that the applicability of forensic analysis is not limited 
to courtroom environments. 
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 Miller et al. [14] classified 3D printers in terms of 
functionality and the requirements for external control. 
Utilizing open source intelligence garnered from the 
manufacturer-produced documentation, they identified 
patterns in the processes used by their classifications to 
move data before and during print operations. They 
found evidence in the description of those processes 
that devices capable of independent operation and 
devices that offering the capability for local design 
storage were very likely to have residual data of the 
print process on the device. The authors called for 
further research to verify their findings. 
Garcia and Varol [19] examined the internal hard 
disk drive of an Object24, a 3D printer manufactured 
by Stratasys. They were able to image the disk through 
a commodity USB adapter and analyzed the image 
with Guidance Software’s EnCase Forensic Suite. 
They were able to recover network configuration data, 
logs, and device settings from the image, but did not 
locate design files or pictures of the printed objects in 
the acquired image. This work represents an initial 
attempt at analyzing an AM device. Further 
examination of the image using additional tools and 
search strategies would enhance the results.  
Current research demonstrates that other types of 
embedded systems have undergone forensic analysis, 
but researchers are just starting to investigate devices 
that associated with AM technologies as potential 
sources of residual data. Currently, there is minimal 
research that focuses on acquiring and analyzing AM 
devices from a forensics perspective.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
This work takes the form of an exploratory case 
study as described by Oates [21]. To investigate the 
hypotheses and associated research questions, a two-
stage approach was adopted based on the strategy 
developed by Souvignet and Frinken [22]. The first 
stage consists of a black box analysis with the goals of 
identifying hardware capabilities, data storage 
locations, and potential access methods. The results of 
the first stage influenced the approach used for the 
second stage. A grey box investigation strategy was 
selected due to the availability of an open source 
distribution [23] of a documented underlying operating 
system [24] along with documentation on the 
implementation of an open source application stack 
[25]; however, nominal information regarding 
manufacturer customizations to that distribution. These 
conditions fulfilled the criteria of incomplete system 
knowledge as utilized by Jehan, Pill, and Wotawa [26] 
to qualify a study as ‘grey box’.  
A single Voxel8 3D printer was selected for this 
investigation. Specific printer information is provided 
in Table 1. This printer is representative of a class of 
printers identified by Miller, et al. [14] as likely to 
contain residual data from the print process. Features 
qualifying this printer for the classification include the 
ability to print objects without a controlling machine 
(standalone operation) and the presence of internal 
storage for g-code files. Two software packages were 
used for analysis in this research: AccessData’s 
Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) version 6.2 [27] and Autopsy 
version 4.1.1 [28]. FTK is a commercial forensics 
platform frequently accepted by U.S. Courts as a 
forensically sound tool. Autopsy is an open source 
forensics platform. These platforms were selected due 
to their ability to filter results based on a set of file 
hashes and license availability at the time of the study. 
  
Table 1: Voxel8 Specifications 
Printing 
Technology 
Fused filament fabrication 
(FFF), Pneumatic Direct Write 
Build Volume 150 mm x 150 mm x 100 mm 
Layer Resolution 100 microns 
Conductive 
Trace Width 
250 microns 
Filament Size 1.75mm 
Materials Polylactic acid (PLA), 
Conductive Silver Ink 
Network 
Connectivity 
Ethernet, Wi-Fi 
 
3.1 Black Box Examination 
 
The equipment used for this work consisted of three 
computers and two media interfacing components. A 
workstation was selected to control the printer during 
the experiment, further referred to as the User PC. 
Interactions with the printer were conducted via the 
Google Chrome web browser. A second workstation 
was selected to perform image acquisitions and 
analysis, further referred to as the Forensics PC. A 
third machine was used to restore image files to the SD 
card. An Insignia USB SD Card Reader (Model NS-
DCR30S2K) was used to interface the SD card to the 
forensics PC and the imaging PC for both read and 
write operations. Read operations involving the SD 
card were conducted via a Wiebtech USB write 
blocker (Model 31300-0192-0000) to prevent 
modifications to the data by the forensics PC. 
Configuration details for the computers utilized in the 
research are presented in Table 2. Hardware was 
selected due to its availability at the time of the 
experiments and exceeding the system requirements 
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 for Google Chrome (User PC), Autopsy and FTK 
(Forensics PC), and dd (Imaging PC). 
A physical inspection of the Voxel8 was conducted 
to locate and examine the electronic components of the 
machine. The machine was turned off during the 
examination. Two commodity components were 
identified behind the rear access panel that constituted 
much of the circuitry in the machine. These 
components consisted of a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B 
v1.1 and a RepRap Arduino-compatible MotherBoard 
(RAMBo) v1.3.  
Table 2: Hardware 
User PC OS: Windows 7 SP1 64-bit 
Processor: Intel Xeon e5-1607v4 
RAM: 16GB 
Forensics 
PC 
OS: Windows 7 SP1 64-bit 
Processor: Intel Xeon e5-1650v4 
RAM: 32GB 
Imaging PC OS: Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS 
Processor: Intel Core i7-3770 
RAM: 8GB 
SD Card 
Reader 
Insignia Model NS-DCR30S2K 
Write 
Blocker 
Wiebtech Model 31300-0192-0000 
 
It was determined that the Raspberry Pi provided 
the control interface for the machine. This deduction 
was due to a High-Definition Multimedia Interface 
(HDMI) cable and Universal Serial Bus (USB) cable 
connected to the Raspberry Pi and routed to the front 
panel. Additionally, the external network port on the 
Voxel8 was connected to the Raspberry Pi.  Due to the 
cabling connecting the RAMBo to the motors 
controlling the gantry and extruder assembly, it was 
determined that the RAMBo provided control signals 
responsible for the operation of the printer.  
The Raspberry Pi and the RAMBo were connected 
via a USB cable. The Raspberry Pi had a Micro Secure 
Digital (SD) card inserted into its card reader. No other 
storage devices were noted within the chassis. The rear 
compartment of the device is pictured in Figure 1. The 
Raspberry Pi is the green printed circuit board (PCB) 
on the left, and the RAMBo is the green PCB on the 
right in the image. 
The micro SD card was imaged for further 
analysis. The following process was adopted for image 
acquisitions to ensure the data was not corrupted and 
the acquisition process did not alter the data on the SD 
card: 
1. Power down the Voxel8  
2. Turn off the power switch 
3. Remove the Micro SD card from the Raspberry Pi 
and insert it into a Micro SD to SD adapter 
 
 
Figure 1: Rear Compartment of the Voxel8 
 
4. Connect the Micro SD card adapter to the 
forensics PC via the USB write blocker. 
5. Create a RAW disk image from the MicroSD card 
using FTK Imager’s physical acquisition option 
and confirm that the application reports a 
successful verification 
6. Remove the volumes associated with the micro SD 
card through the operating system and disconnect 
the USB write blocker 
FTK Imager produces both Message Digest 5 
(MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) hashes 
of the media during acquisition. It then uses those 
hashes to verify the integrity of the acquired image. A 
text file containing details of the imaging process, such 
as time of the acquisition and the image hashes 
generated by FTK, was saved with the image file. The 
images were saved in a RAW format to facilitate 
restoration to the original media. 
The initial image was successfully imported into 
Autopsy with all ingest modules selected. Exploration 
of the content revealed a Master Boot Record (MBR) 
partition scheme with 4MB of unallocated space at the 
beginning of the media and two defined partitions, one 
File Allocation Table (FAT) partition of 60MB and 
one Linux partition of 15,143MB. Figure 2 is a 
screenshot of the partition table, top-level directory 
trees, and hexadecimal presentation of the beginning of 
the initial state image shown in Autopsy. 
Except for the MBR, the unallocated space at the 
beginning of the media contained no data (all bytes 
recorded as 0x00). There was no boot code present in 
the first 446 bytes of the MBR. 
The FAT partition was formatted FAT16 and 
contained bootstrap code for an Advanced Reduced 
Instruction Set Computing (RISC) Machine (ARM) 
version of Linux. Also present were several Device 
Tree Blob (DTB) files describing a Broadcom 
hardware set and configuration files for Octopi, an 
ARM Debian Linux distribution built for operating 3D 
printers.  
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Figure 2: SD card partitioning and file system 
 
The Linux partition was determined to contain an 
Extended File System (ext) based on the superblock 
location and signature. The folder structure in the root 
of the filesystem included folders specified by the Unix 
Filesystem Hierarchy Standard [29]. Files in the folder 
/etc identified the operating system distribution (Octopi 
v0.13.0) and further identified the Debian distribution 
from which it was derived (Raspbian Jesse release 
2016-02-09). 
 
3.2. Grey Box Testing 
 
A series of one group, pre-test, post-test 
experiments as described by Oates [21] was developed 
to assess changes in the state of the files stored on the 
Voxel8’s SD Card as a result of user actions. 
Comparison of file content was conducted by 
comparing Message Digest 5 (MD5) hashes calculated 
from the individual files. Differences in MD5 file 
hashes indicate a difference in the hashed content. The 
dataset used for this experiment consisted of a single 
new G-code file titled Forensic_Test_Print.gcode and a 
single G-code file selected from files already present 
on the Voxel8 titled Rectangular_Test_Print.gcode. 
MD5 hashes for the G-code files were generated and 
used to create an alert hash set for use for FTK’s KFF. 
A second hash set was generated from the MD5 hash 
values of all the files present in the image from the 
micro SD card extracted from the Voxel8. The second 
hash set was used to establish an ignore hash set for the 
KFF. 
The experiment was divided into an eleven-stage 
process. The process was repeated for each state 
manipulation sequence examined. 
1. Restore the initial image acquired from the micro 
SD card during the black box examination to the 
micro SD card and verify the restored media’s 
integrity by comparing the block device’s MD5 
hash to that recorded by FTK Imager for the 
image. 
2. Insert the micro SD into the Raspberry Pi 
3. Power on the Voxel8 printer 
4. Perform state manipulations 
5. Power down the Voxel8 using the devices front 
panel display. 
6. Turn off the power switch 
7. Remove the Micro SD card from the Raspberry Pi 
and insert it into a Micro SD to SD adapter 
8. Connect the Micro SD card adapter to the 
forensics PC via the USB write blocker 
9. Create a RAW disk image from the MicroSD card 
with FTK Imager’s physical acquisition option and 
confirm that the application reports a successful 
verification. 
10. Remove the volumes associated with the micro SD 
card through the operating system and disconnect 
the USB write blocker 
11. Import the image into FTK 
 
3.3. State Manipulations 
 
The process resulted in an image documenting the 
state of the device after each state manipulation 
sequence. The manipulation sequences were as 
follows: 
1. Upload a File: Log into the Voxel8’s OctoPrint 
web server as ‘admin’ and upload a design titled 
‘Forensics Test Print’.  
2. Upload and Print a File: Log into the Voxel8’s 
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and upload a 
design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’. Start the print 
by selecting the ‘Start Print’ prompt on the page 
and accepting the default options. Allow the job to 
complete and respond ‘Yes’ to the ‘Print 
completed successfully’ option on the front panel.  
3. Delete an Existing File: Log into the Voxel8’s 
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and delete the file 
‘Rectangular Test Token’ from the Voxel8 
4. Upload and Delete a File: Log into the Voxel8’s 
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and upload a 
design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’. Then delete 
the file ‘Forensics Test Print’ from the Voxel8. 
5. Upload, Print, and Delete a File: Log into the 
Voxel8’s OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and 
uploaded a design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’. 
Start the print by selecting the ‘Start Print’ prompt 
on the page and accepting the default options. 
Allow the job to complete and responded ‘Yes’ to 
the ‘Print completed successfully’ prompt on the 
front panel. Delete the file ‘Forensics Test Print’ 
from the device through the OctoPrint web server. 
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 6. Cancel a Print: Log into the Voxel8’s OctoPrint 
web server as ‘admin’ and start a print for the file 
‘Rectangular Test Token’ by selecting ‘Start Print’ 
in the web interface and accepting all the default 
options. When printing starts, press the ‘X’ button, 
on the front panel to cancel the print job. When 
prompted, select ‘Print Problem’ on the front panel 
as the reason for halting the job.  
7. Cancel and Delete a Print: Log into the Voxel8’s 
OctoPrint web server as ‘admin’ and uploaded a 
design titled ‘Forensics Test Print’. Start the print 
by selecting ‘Start Print’ on the page and accepting 
the default options. When printing starts, press the 
‘X’ button on the front panel to cancel the print 
job. When prompted, select ‘Print Problem’ on the 
front panel as the reason for halting the job. Then 
delete the file ‘Forensics Test Print’ from the 
device through the OctoPrint web server. 
8. Printing and Canceling using the Front Panel: 
Initiate a print of the design ‘Rectangular Test 
Token’ from the front panel. When printing starts, 
press the ‘X’ button, on the front panel, to cancel 
the print job. When prompted, select ‘Print 
Problem’ on the front panel as the reason for 
halting the job. 
9. Printing, Canceling and Deleting using the Front 
Panel: Initiate a print of the design ‘Rectangular 
Test Token’ from the front panel. When printing 
starts, press the ‘X’ button on the front panel to 
cancel the print job. When prompted, select ‘Print 
Problem’ on the front panel as the reason for 
halting the job. Then delete the file ‘Rectangular 
Test Token’ from the device through the front 
panel menu. 
10. Update Printer Firmware through OctoPrint: 
Instruct the Voxel8 to download and install a 
firmware update through OctoPrint’s web 
interface. The front panel displays an ‘Update 
Complete’ upon task completion.  
 
3.4 Data Processing 
 
Per the Computer History Model proposed by 
Carrier and Spafford [30], the differences between the 
images are the result of events which occurred on the 
device between the image acquisitions. Cryptographic 
hash values were utilized to determine whether 
individual files were changed between the initial and 
post-manipulation images. The hash sets were loaded 
as custom hash sets into the KFF server component of 
FTK. The hash set containing the known G-code files 
was configured as alert file set, and the hash set 
containing all files extracted from the initially acquired 
image was configured as a known file set. The results 
presented by FTK after hiding the known files were 
filtered to include only allocated, non-deleted files. 
These files were flagged for manual file inspection to 
determine their content and included both changed and 
newly created files with unique content. A specific 
search was conducted for the G-code file ‘Rectangular 
Test Token’ by its hash value against the initially 
acquired image and the file locations were recorded.  
These file locations were searched for in the images to 
determine the state of those files due to overlap in the 
hash sets. 
 
3.5. Limitations 
 
This study examines a single instance the Voxel8 
printer, but seventy-one (71) consumer 3D printer 
models are listed on OctoPrint’s supported printers 
page and six of those models utilize the hardware 
combination of a Raspberry Pi and a RAMBo [31]. It 
should be noted that there were no visible or 
documented means to reset the machine to a factory 
default setting. Testing of this machine required 
connectivity to the general Internet and there is the 
possibility that the machine was subjected to network 
traffic not included as part of the experiment. Data 
carving and event-correlation are considered out of 
scope for the purposes of this work. 
 
4. Results and Analysis  
 
Differences in the file systems were detected each 
experiment. Table 3 summarizes the number of 
differences identified between the initial and post 
manipulation images. Differences include file changes, 
creations, and deletions. Ninety (90) unique files were 
altered by ten (10) experiments. Uniqueness was 
defined by file location and base file name. 
  
Table 3: File system changes by experiment 
Manipulation set Changes 
Upload a File 52 
Upload and Print a File 66 
Delete an Existing File 51 
Upload and Delete a File 59 
Upload, Print, and Delete a File 61 
Cancel a Print 50 
Cancel and Delete a Print 49 
Printing and Canceling using the Front 
Panel 
50 
Printing, Canceling and Deleting using 
the Front Panel 
51 
Updating Printer Firmware through 
OctoPrint 
80 
Unique files changed 90 
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 4.1. Manual File Inspection 
 
Manual inspection of the files identified by FTK 
revealed several instances of data related to the print 
process. A summary of notable changes follows: 
/home/pi/.octoprint/logs/octoprint.log: The log retained 
interactions with the OctoPrint server such as the 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of clients connecting to 
it as well as system level commands initiated by the 
user. For manipulations including the upload of a file, a 
reference to the name of the design with an appended 
numeric identifier and timestamp were found in the 
log. In some cases, a log rotation mechanism split the 
log file. There were not any unique identifiers noted 
for users or external devices. 
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads/.metadata.yaml: The 
file containing a list of uploaded G-code files. The 
device recorded attributes of those files, including file 
name, the SHA1 hash of the file, estimated print time 
and filament usage, a numeric identifier for the print 
file, and the time and status of the last print attempt. In 
runs that included a delete manipulation, the data for 
the deleted file was not present in the list. 
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads/Forensics_Test_Print-
224546099-<UTC Timestamp>.gcode: A copy of the 
‘Forensic Test Print’ file uploaded to the device was 
found in this location. The integrity of the file was 
verified by SHA1 and MD5 hash values that are 
identical to the hash values of the file uploaded to the 
Voxel8 during the experiments. The file was only 
present during state manipulations that included file 
upload and did not include a delete operation.  
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads/Rectangular_Test_To
ken-770373878-2017-09-11T21-27-35.303Z.gcode: A 
copy of the design ‘Rectangular Test Token’ file was 
identified at this location. The file was not present in 
images taken after manipulation sequences that 
included a step to delete that design file. The hash 
value for this file was also associated with a file in the 
ext partition named /root/.cache/chromium/Default 
/Cache/F_000016. 
/root/.cache/chromium/Default/Cache/data_3: A 
binary file containing browser cache data from 
Chromium was identified. The file contained a copy of 
the uploaded G-code file intermingled with additional 
information. This data remained on the machine during 
experimental runs that included deletion of the 
uploaded file. 
/root/.cache/chromium/Default/Cache/F_000017: 
A copy of the uploaded G-code file “Forensic Test 
Print” was retrieved from this location. The content of 
the file was verified against the file uploaded to the 
Voxel8 by SHA1 and MD5 hash values. The file was 
present after all upload operations and remained on the 
machine after the design was  deleted. 
/root/.config/chromium/Default/CurrentSession: A 
binary file that appeared to contain references to the 
states of the printer shown on the front panel interface 
of the device was retrieved from this location. 
References were extracted from the file by excluding 
non-printable characters. 
/root/.config/chromium/Default/History: An 
SQLLite database file containing URLs that mirrored 
the navigation of the device conducted via the front 
panel interface was retrieved from this location. The 
entries contained labels such as ‘menu:print’ and 
‘menu:delete’ with timestamps present in cases where 
the item was selected. 
 
4.2 Aggregate Change Analysis 
 
Examining the distribution of changes reveals 
details about the operation of the device. Figure 3 
shows a heat map of the number of changes by 
directory and normalized by directory. Directories 
which did not have a change occur are excluded from 
the heat map. No changes were identified in the FAT 
partition. Changes that occurred within the ext partition 
were constrained to five top-level directories: /etc, 
/home, /root, /tmp, and /var. The heat map shows 
variation in the numbers of changed files in 
/home/pi/.octoprint, /root/.cache/chromium/Default/ 
Cache, and /root/.config/chromium. The map also 
indicates differences where the changes occurred 
depending on the manipulation. For instance, the 
firmware update affected files in different directories 
than non-administrative operations.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
The changed files identified in this work included 
metadata concerning the print operations, the G-code 
files, and device log files. The presence of this 
information has implications for the forensic, security, 
and privacy issues surrounding the device.  
On the forensic front, this device serves as a 
potential source of information during an investigation. 
The residual data contains several references to what 
occurred on the device, namely what was printed, 
when it printed, and the state of that print job. While 
legitimate interactions did result in the removal of the 
metadata for the print files, copies of the G-code 
appeared in several file system locations, and those 
copies maintained in the Chromium cache persisted 
after deletion. In the absence of the means to reset the 
device, this information would persist until the cache 
was cleared due to excessive size. There were no 
instances of cache clearing observed during this 
experiment. 
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 It was also noted that the device did not maintain 
explicit entries recording the deletion of print files 
from the machine. In this experiment, file deletion was 
inferred from the difference between the acquired 
images. Because the files are maintained in the 
Chromium cache, purposeful deletion can be inferred 
by correlating the absence of the file in 
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads with files existing in  
/root/ .cache / chromium / Default/Cache. 
The chassis used for the device was not secured 
and commodity hardware was used in its construction. 
There was also no encryption used on any of the 
altered files, nor was there encryption applied to either 
the ext or FAT volumes. From a security perspective, 
the ease of access makes the device very difficult to 
secure. Consequently, protecting the data contained on 
the device from malicious actors it is difficult. From a 
forensic standpoint, these factors reduced the 
complexity of data acquisition and analysis. All that 
was necessary to access the data in this case was to 
remove the SD card and use the acquisition and 
analysis tools as they were intended. 
This work provides contrast to other examinations 
of AM devices that exist in the literature. In both this 
work and Garcia and Varol [19], tools commonly 
accepted in U.S courts were used, but the differential 
techniques used in this examination were able to locate  
residual data of interest, specifically the g-code files 
for the printed models, not located in previous 
research, even in cases where the data of interest were 
intermingled with other data. Similarly, the differential 
techniques did not identify files with static 
configuration data, such as the network configuration 
or authentication keys. Hybrid techniques are likely to 
provide the best picture of a device’s history. 
The change patterns illustrated in the heat map as 
illustrated in Figure 3 indicate the files with which the 
software interacted varied depended on the activities 
which occurred. The data collected was of insufficient 
size to perform statistical modeling of the interactions 
between the actions and observed changes. The 
visually inferred variance from the heat map prompted 
additional investigations into which files were 
responsible. In the case of /root/.config/chromium, a 
substantial number of changes were due to Chromium 
updating whitelists used for its Safe Browsing feature. 
These updates did not occur during every test, and 
there was no activity prescribed by the test protocol 
intended to cause such an update. For 
/home/pi/.octoprint/uploads, the variance resulted from 
the addition of the g-code files and modification of 
metadata.yaml, which resulted from actions prescribed 
by the experimental method. Consequently, a usage 
profile based on aggregate changes would require a 
Figure 3: Heatmap of changes by directory and experiment run 
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 manual review to identify changes captured that were 
not relevant to the activity of interest. In the context of 
this device, the most relevant directories were found to 
be /home/pi/.octoprint/uploads,/home/pi/.octoprint/logs 
and /root/.cache/chromium/Default/Cache. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work  
 
This work demonstrates a successful retrieval of 
data from a specific AM device. The device utilized 
commodity flash storage to contain the operating 
system for the device providing interface and control 
functionality. This hardware configuration permitted 
off-the-shelf equipment to be used to acquire data from 
the device. The use of a common partition table and 
file system did not require any special software to 
interpret the image. For this device, there were no 
complications introduced into the acquisition processes 
by how the data was stored 
This work also found that files changed during 
operation of the Voxel8’s contained residual data 
concerning the print process. The residual data 
included G-code files and metadata detailing the time 
actions were performed on the device. There were 
notable holes in the metadata, specifically related to 
authentication. This data would be suitable for 
inferring that something occurred and providing some 
information useful for identifying where the event was 
initiated. However, little in the changed data could be 
positively linked to static configuration parameters, 
such as keys, certificates, or user identifiers.  
The tools selected for this work were capable of 
ingesting and interpreting the images acquired from the 
Voxel8. The base functionality of the software, that of 
storage media image ingest and the ability to filter 
results based on a hash database, were sufficient to 
conduct the analysis detailed in this work. The use of 
the KFF did reduce the number of files subjected to 
manual inspection, but the manual file inspection 
process was still long and arduous.  
Changes were only detected in five out of the 21 
top-level directories of one volume during this 
experiment. Of the active top-level directories, a 
similar pattern of changes was only present in a small 
subset of directories that persisted. This result could be 
of significant use to forensic investigators in device 
triage situations, and security practitioners for 
identifying anomalous activity. Both activities would 
require an authoritative profile source to guide their 
actions. This source could be either the manufacturer 
of the device or a trusted organization.  
This work shows that data can be extracted from 
an AM device. It also shows that the data extracted 
from the device did contain information about the 
operation of the printer. Further, this work used open 
source and commercial forensics platforms to ingest 
and process acquisitions from the device. Using the 
filtering capabilities of these platforms, a method was 
designed which resulted a reduction in the number of 
manual file inspections to a handful of files without 
full knowledge of how the system operates. Based on 
these results, it is concluded that it is possible to profile 
an AM device to locate residual data relevant to 
legitimate user activities. 
Future work will look at performing similar 
analysis on other AM platforms. These efforts will 
identify emerging trends in the system architectures 
present in these devices and identify common 
acquisition and analysis techniques for practitioners. 
Additionally, further development of profiling methods 
will be conducted to explore the use of statistical 
modeling techniques to correlate activities with 
expected changes to the file system. Further work is 
also necessary to examine the correlation between 
events recorded by the device with events that occur on 
other devices in AM systems. 
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